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I. INTRODUCTION
Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to begin my remarks this morning with
a little audience participation. 1 I'm going to ask for a show of hands on two ques-
tions: First, how many of you have invested the 197 minutes it takes to watch the
United States Senator from West Virginia, 1959 - present; B.A., Marshall University; LL.B., J.D.,
American University. Robert C. Byrd has served in the United States Senate since January 3, 1959, including
four years as Secretary of the Senate Democratic Conference (1967-1970), and six years as Senate Minority
Leader (1981-1986). In 1989, Senator Byrd became Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, a
position he held until 1995. He is now the Ranking Member of the Appropriations Committee. He was also
elected by his colleagues in 1989 as President pro tempore of the Senate, a post that placed him third in the
line of succession to the Presidency. With that honor, Senator Byrd achieved the distinction of having held
more leadership positions in the U.S. Senate than any other Senator of any party in Senate history. In 1994,
Senator Byrd was elected to a seventh consecutive six-year term in the Senate, making him one of only three
U.S. Senators in American history to achieve that milestone. Adding to these already historic accomplish-
ments, on July 27, 1996, Senator Byrd became the first U.S. Senator in history to cast 14,000 votes.
I This is the text of the address delivered by Senator Byrd at the West Virginia University College
of Law on April 15, 1998, for the symposium titled "200 Years of Balance: A Symposium on the History of
the Constitution and the Separation of Powers." The address, delivered to an audience of students and fac-
ulty members in the WVU College of Law's Marlyn E. Lugar Courtroom, presents a history lesson on the
United States Constitution and the separation of powers between the three branches of our national govern-
ment: legislative, executive, and judicial. As a result of the effective arguments of Senator Byrd and others,
the U.S. Supreme Court, on June 25, 1998, revoked the line item veto power bestowed on the Chief Executive
by Congress in 1995.
1
Byrd: Remarks by U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd The Constitution in Peril
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
current hit movie "Titanic?"
As I suspected, that's nearly the entire group. That also explains why the
folks at Paramount Pictures are so happy these days. By the way, for those of you
who are "Titanic" buffs, yesterday, April 15, marked the eighty-sixth anniversary
of the sinking of that famous ship.
Now, let me see a show of hands from those of you who have also invested
197 minutes actually reading the United States Constitution. Well, that's certainly
not a "titanic" proportion. For those of you who did not raise your hand to the
second question, I can tell you that you are not alone. It seems that, as a nation, we
love our Constitution, but, at the same time, few of us know much about it.
In fact, in a recent nationwide poll, ninety-one percent of the respondents
agreed with this statement: "[t]he U.S. Constitution is important to me." Yet, de-
spite such overwhelming reverence for the Constitution, only fifty-eight percent of
those polled were able to answer correctly that the Constitution establishes the
three branches that make up our federal government. Only sixty-six percent recog-
nized that the first ten amendments to the Constitution are known as the Bill of
Rights. Eighty-five percent mistakenly believed that the Constitution says that "all
men are created equal," or could not identify at all where that famous statement
came from; and only fifty-eight percent identified the following statement as false:
"[t]he Constitution states that the first language of the United States is English."
Such poll results are troubling, but they are also enormously illuminating.
They tell us that while our educational system is good at ingraining feelings of re-
spect and reverence for our Constitution, that same system is apparently very poor
at teaching just what is actually in the Constitution and just why it is so important.
Such a poll also tells us something else. It tells us that many Americans
really are hugely ignorant about history. Yet, our Constitution is rooted in history
- history that includes the theories, judgments, real life experiences, and sacrifices
of millions of men and women for generations which go back even a thousand
years and beyond!
So, I am here today at the kind invitation of President Hardesty to talk and
to think with you about this marvelous Constitution of ours - about some of its
taproots and origins, about its relevance and place in our personal lives - your life
and mine - and in the life of our nation today.
In the first half of my speech, I shall trace the origins of our Constitution -
in the Bible, in the colonial trading company charters, in the political philosophy of
Europe and classical antiquity, in colonial and state constitutions, in the Articles of
Confederation, and in English history.
After we touch upon the various roots of the Constitution, we shall discuss
one of the most important elements of the Constitution - the power of the purse -
and trace its historical basis and its importance. We shall then explore several re-
cent instances in which Congress has undermined its own power, including the
exercise of the power of the purse by its passage of the Line Item Veto Act.
Was the Constitution, as Herbert Spencer would have us think, "obtained
by a happy accident, not by normal progress?" Was Gladstone correct in his re-
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puted observation that the American Constitution was "the most wonderful work
ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man?" Well, hardly.
The genius of the Constitution may lie more in the collective knowledge of history,
of human nature, and of government, residing in the minds of the Framers - their
experience, judgment, and political savvy, if you will - than in sheer creativity or
originality.
In 1787, the only written Constitutions existing anywhere in the world
were to be found already at work right here in English-speaking North America. I
refer, of course, to the 13 state constitutions and to our first national Constitution -
the Articles of Confederation, which had become operative in 1781.
The document written in 1787 in Philadelphia did not spring full grown
and fully clothed from the minds of the Framers, like Minerva from the brain of
Jove. No, indeed! It was the product of long years of experience. The Framers
had great familiarity with the tested results of the state constitutions and the Arti-
cles of Confederation. Additionally, their political acumen, their knowledge of
classical history and continental and British political theory and the British and
colonial experience, all came into play in the effort at Philadelphia. At Philadel-
phia, all of these were honed and tailored by the Framers to fit a long tradition of
American constitutionalism that had really begun two centuries earlier with the
letters patent to Sir Humphrey Gilbert in 1578 and Sir Walter Raleigh's Charter of
1584.
And of course we must not forget the influence of the Bible. Yes, I said
the Bible. The whole notion of a nation, ruled by structured covenants and com-
pacts had its origins in the Judeo-Christian tradition of a just God ruling over, and
showering His favors upon, man in exchange for mankind's obedience. The
American constitutional tradition derived much of its form and content from Judeo-
Christian roots as interpreted by the radical Protestant and other religious groups to
which so many of the original European settlers in British North America belonged.
This was especially true in New England where covenant theology, social contract
theory, and the concepts of a "higher law" blended together.
Donald S. Lutz, in his work entitled, The Origins of American Constitu-
tionalism, says: "[t]he tribes of Israel shared a covenant that made them a nation.
Make no mistake about it, American federalism originated at least in part in the
dissenting Protestants' familiarity with the Bible."
The typical charters granted from the English Crown were also covenants
which generally required that the colonists pledge their loyalty to the crown in ex-
change for license to form their own local governments, as long as the laws which
the colonists established were not repugnant to English law. Although the colonies
were nominally controlled by boards of directors in England, the sheer distance
between the British Isles and the colonies, the preoccupation of the British with
external threats, together with domestic unrest in England, made it possible for the
American colonies to operate with considerable latitude in the formation of their
own governments and the administration of their own affairs. Therefore, the colo-
nists wrote documents which, of necessity, reflected local viewpoints and peculi-
1998]
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arities. These early colonial documents were the forerunners to the various state
constitutions, providing a wealth of practical experience in conceptualizing consti-
tutional principles and applying them to the science of workable government.
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONS
On February 21, 1787, the Confederation Congress resolved that a con-
vention be held in May "for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of
Confederation" and reporting to Congress and the state legislatures such alterations
in the Articles as would "render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies
of government and the preservation of the Union."
But the Framers went beyond the purposes for which Congress had called
the convention. Instead of proposing revisions and alterations in the Articles of
Confederation, they proposed a new Constitution! It was a bold stroke, indeed.
The Framers were pragmatic politicians, as well as learned men, knowl-
edgeable of history and government theory, but they never lost sight of the fact that
after the hard task of writing the new Constitution had been completed, there was
still the very difficult requirement for ratification by the states. Their own reputa-
tions were at stake, as well as the fate of the nation. In order to create a new entity,
a national government, the Framers knew that they had to convince the states to
voluntarily reduce their own powers to some extent. With that goal in mind, what
better place to look for convincing models of form and language for the new Con-
stitution than to those state and colonial constitutional documents which already
reflected a consensus of local opinion in the various states, and which had obtained
a certain legitimacy, because they had been tested and lived under?
It is no accident then, that we see large portions of the various state con-
stitutions reborn in our national charter. For instance, let us examine Article I of
the Constitution and observe the amazing conformity with the equivalent provi-
sions of various state constitutions that had been written a decade earlier in 1776
and 1777.
Article I, Section 1, of the U.S. Constitution establishes bicameralism at
the national level by vesting all legislative powers in a Congress, consisting of a
Senate and House. At least nine of the state constitutions had similar provisions
which vested the lawmaking powers in a legislature consisting of two separate
bodies.
The concept of bicameralism, or two houses, was intended to guarantee
deliberation in the exercise of legislative power, by requiring that measures be de-
bated and approved by two different bodies before becoming law. Bicameralism
institutionalizes deliberation. Its purpose is to afford protection from the mischief
latent in popular self-government.
The Great Compromise which was worked out at the Convention and
agreed to on July 16, 1787, provided that the Senate would represent a forum of the
states - with all states, large and small, having an equal number of votes - while
the House of Representatives would reflect the views of, and its representation
[Vol. 101:385
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would be in proportion to, the population. Most certainly, this approach was bor-
rowed from the example set by the constitution of New York.
The requirement in the U.S. Constitution that revenue bills originate in the
House of Representatives was prefigured by at least seven state constitutions, of
which Massachusetts and Delaware permitted their senates to propose or concur
with amendments to revenue bills as was also later provided in the U.S. Constitu-
tion.
The Presentment Clause of Article 1, Section 7, of the U.S. Constitution
has been very much in the news lately as it has become the target of that insidious
device known as the line item veto. The similarity of the complicated language in
the U.S. Constitution's veto and Presentment Clause to the equally complex lan-
guage of the Massachusetts and New York state constitutions is enough to make
one sit up and take notice. Except for some slight variations, the U.S. Constitution
appears to replicate, almost verbatim, the text set forth in these two state constitu-
tions. It cannot be said with a straight face that this is a matter of mere coinci-
dence. One can easily see the fine hand and the eloquent voice of Alexander Ham-
ilton, of New York, and Rufus King, of Massachusetts, in the behind-the-scenes
discussions that probably occurred in the Convention with respect to these and
other clauses in the Constitution which sometimes appear to have been copied,
almost word for word, from one or more of the state constitutions.
Other similarities between some of the state constitutions and the U.S.
Constitution have to do with the requirement of the legislature to assemble at least
once in every year; legislators' privilege from arrest; the laying of taxes by the leg-
islative branch; and prohibitions against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.
These are just a few of the striking similarities among many of the early
state constitutions and the product of the constitutional convention in Philadelphia.
The institutional structure set up by our Constitution and even the wording, in con-
siderable measure, had obviously incubated in the laboratory of colonial and state
experience. But what of the philosophy behind the selection of the prime parts of
these test-tube constitutions? To what extent had the Framers been influenced by
the political theorists and republican spokesmen of Britain and the Continent?
I11. POLITICAL THEORISTS
John Locke may be said to have symbolized the dominant political tradi-
tion in America down to and during the convention of 1787. Locke believed that
society and government are only devices which men agree to in order to secure
additional protection for their preexisting rights. Locke had taught social contract
theory; he had advocated that taxation without representation or consent is tyranny.
As representatives of the people, the legislature was supreme, Locke be-
lieved, but - and this is important - even it was subject to the higher laws of soci-
ety, and as such, it ought to be controlled by some sort of fundamental device. His
solution was to limit and control government by separating the legislative from the
administrative functions of government so that power could not be monopolized by
1998]
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either.
The renowned French philosopher, Montesquieu also had a considerable
impact upon the philosophy of the Framers, and educated Americans in general
were well acquainted with his writings. He had experienced the results of tyranny
in his native France, and believed that only separating the judicial, executive, and
legislative branches would avoid the certain abuse of concentrated power.
James Harrington in his work, Oceana, presented a republican constitu-
tional utopia. He proposed a two-chamber legislature as a caution against the dan-
gers of extreme democracy. Harrington was an advocate of mixed government.
The Senate of his Oceana would represent the property-owning aristocracy; a large
assembly elected by the common people was to represent democracy; with an ex-
ecutive representing the monarchical element to provide a balance of power.
But the notion of mixed government had its actual origins in classical an-
tiquity. Herodotus had expounded it in his writings concerning Persia. The king,
the aristocracy, and the common man were pitted against each other in their sym-
bolic forms in one, three-part, mixed-government scheme with the aim of checking
power, creating balance, and thus achieving stability.
Polybius, the Greek historian who lived circa 205-125 B.C., extolled the
virtues of the Roman Republic and believed that it was an outstanding example of
the benefits of a mixed government system. The Roman Constitution, with its three
power elements - the consuls (executive), the Senate, and the people - regulated
those powers with a scrupulous equilibrium, and it relied on checks to maintain
balance. Polybius summed it up this way:
[w]hen any one of the three classes becomes puffed up, and
manifests an inclination to be contentious and unduly en-
croaching, the mutual interdependency of all the three, and the
possibility of the pretensions of any one being checked and
thwarted by the others, must plainly check this tendency. And
so the proper equilibrium is maintained by the impulsiveness
of the one part being checked by its fear of the other.
Did the classics influence the Founders? Of course. Since the founders
were steeped in the classics, it is not surprising that they looked to the Roman Re-
public, to ancient history, and to classical writings when they sat together to write
the American Constitution.
Let us not forget that prior to, and immediately following, the American
Revolution, thousands of circulars, pamphlets, and newspaper columns attested to
the erudition of Americans, who well understood and delighted in classical allu-
sions. Moreover, the eighteenth century educational system provided a rich classi-
cal grounding for the founders, making them familiar with Ovid, Homer, Horace,
Virgil, Tacitus, Thucydides, Livius, Plutarch, Suetonius, and many more.
The leading figures of the day were undoubtedly influenced by a thorough
knowledge of the vices as well as the virtues of the Roman Republic and the Ro-
man Empire, the orations of Cicero and the Greek Demosthenes, and the wisdom to
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be found in the Holy scriptures. They used classical symbols, pseudonyms, and
allusions to communicate through pamphlets and the press. Remember, the Feder-
alist essays by Hamilton, Madison, and John Jay were signed "Publius."
Carl J. Richard put it this way in his book, The Founders and the Classics:
"[i]t is my contention that the classics exerted a formative influence upon the foun-
ders, both directly and through the mediation of Whig and American perspectives.
The classics supplied mixed government theory, the principal basis for the U.S.
Constitution.... In short, the classics supplied a large portion of the founders' in-
tellectual tools."
The rich tapestry of political theory with which the Framers were so fa-
miliar had profound impact on them as they drafted the Constitution.
IV. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
But, the main ingredient in the constitutional soup was in many ways a
document which failed, and about which not much is generally known - the Arti-
cles of Confederation.
The Articles of Confederation were the direct written predecessor to the
Constitution. They were, in effect, an experiment. They taught hard and valuable
lessons that would be remembered. The system created by the Articles was fatally
flawed in a number of ways. It was really only a sort of "league of friendship"
agreed to by the states. Congress consisted of one House only, in which each of the
thirteen states had only one vote. And Congress wore two hats. It not only served
as the legislative branch but was also given the duties of the executive. But, despite
all of this authority, it was not given any real means of enforcement. Congress had
no control over foreign or interstate commerce, and no power to raise money
through taxation. It could only make requisitions on the states and then hope that
the states would respond affirmatively, which was frequently not the case. In for-
eign affairs, Congress could approve treaties, but it had no means to make the states
obey treaty requirements.
In order to appease the states' natural aversion to central authority, the
Continental Congress, which wrote the Articles of Confederation, dealt with the
people only through the filter of the several states, and it provided no authority for
the national government to act directly upon citizens. This was no doubt the great-
est weakness under the Articles. Attempts to change and improve the Articles
failed because it was impossible to get the unanimous consent of the legislatures of
the thirteen states, which was required for any amendment to the Articles - another
fatal flaw.
Yet, the Articles of Confederation must not be considered as a total failure.
They must not be underestimated in importance. The Continental Congress - in
devising the Articles - had framed the first written Constitution ever to establish a
system of government in which certain powers were vested in a central government
while others were retained by state governments - an extraordinary historical
achievement!
1998]
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The fledgling nation profited greatly by having lived under these seriously
flawed Articles for six years. Indeed, the experience of the difficulties for the na-
tion under the cumbersome Articles added needed efficacy to the newly-crafted,
but controversial concept of federalism, and to the understanding by the people that
while the states' powers needed protecting, the national government must have
some limited, but direct, powers of its own over individual citizens. In this case,
experience provided a foundation that no amount of theorizing could have created.
Hence, the wisdom and experience that came to fruition in the U.S. Con-
stitution had germinated in the colonies' attempts at written constitutions and char-
ters, the state constitutions, the Articles of Confederation, the Framers' grounding
in the classics, and the wisdom of church covenants and the Bible.
V. THE BRITISH BACKGROUND
But what of the history of the motherland? Many of the bedrock principles
and institutional concepts and practices embedded in American constitutionalism
hark back to England or, in some instances, even to the Anglo-Saxon period prior
to the Norman conquest.
Although the English Constitution is largely unwritten, it does include
many written documents such as the Magna Carta (1215), the Petition of Right
(1628), and the English Bill of Rights (1689), all of which, to some degree, directly
influenced the content of our own Constitution. Various other English charters,
common law court decisions, and statutes composed the English constitutional
matrix, and they were also eventually reflected in our own organic law framed in
Philadelphia.
For example, the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum: "[y]ou have the
body." Habeas corpus is one of the most celebrated of all Anglo-American judicial
procedures and has been called, the "Great Writ of Liberty." It derives from the
English common law writ that commanded that a prisoner be produced at the court
for such disposition as the court might order. Traces of its existence can be found
in the reigns of Edward III, Henry VI, and Henry VII, and some scholars even trace
it to a Roman source and specifically refer to the forty-third book of the Pandects.
The first text is the line from the "Perpetual Edicts," where the praetor declares,
"produce the freeman whom you unlawfully detain."
Under Charles II, the habeas corpus act of 1679 guaranteed that no British
subject should be imprisoned without being speedily brought to trial, establishing
an effective procedure to examine the sufficiency of the actual cause for holding a
prisoner. We can see the principle of showing just cause for detention in Article I
of the Constitution, which absolutely prohibits suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, "unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may re-
quire it."
Another English statute that made its impact on the thinking of the Framers
was the British Act of Settlement of 1701, which mandated that royal judges were
to hold their offices for life instead of "during the king's good pleasure," as had
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been the case prior to 1701. After 1701, judges could be removed only as a result
of charges of misconduct, which had to be proved in Parliament. The Framers in-
sured the independence of the federal judiciary by adopting the phrase "during
good behavior" in Article III of the Constitution, to define the tenure of federal
judges.
The forerunner of our own grand jury, referred to in the fifth amendment to
the Constitution, hails from the time of William the Conqueror, in 1066, and the
trial jury probably also had Continental origins. Although, according to Sir Wil-
liam Blackstone, in England, mention of juries was found "so early as the laws of
King Ethelred, and that not as a new invention." By 1275, in the reign of Edward
I, it was firmly established that a petit jury of 12 neighbors would determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused. Five centuries later, jury trial in criminal cases
was required by Article III of the United States Constitution. The next time you are
called for jury duty, take a moment to ponder the fact that you are participating in a
procedure with historical roots that stretch back 900 years or more.
But, the supreme fountainhead of English liberty was, of course, the
Magna Carta, signed by King John on June 15, 1215 - 783 years ago! It is one of
the enduring symbols of limited government and the rule of law. It was the lan-
guage of practical men and it proclaimed no abstract principles, but simply, in
sixty-three clauses, redressed wrongs.
Five centuries later its impact on our Federal Constitution, for example,
was evident in the "due process" phrase, which is equivalent to the "law of the
land" phrase in Magna Carta - the Great Charter - whose impact was also evident
in the guarantees for "just compensation" in the Fifth Amendment of our own Bill
of Rights, and the "excessive fines" prohibition in the Eighth Amendment. Even
Congress' Article I power to fix the standard of weights and measures was not
something new, for the barons at Runnymede required, in Magna Carta, such stan-
dards.
The Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination and the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures" were exam-
ples of the evolutionary process by which, in some instances, certain ancient ele-
ments of the British constitution were filtered through the state constitutions and
later into the U.S. Constitution.
But by the end of the revolutionary era the American idea of a constitution
differed dramatically from the English. The English Constitution included funda-
mental principles and rights, and all existing laws, traditions, and institutions. It
was not written - not a separate document with a unique standing. It was what it
was. As such, the common law and every law enacted by Parliament became part
of the British Constitution. As Blackstone had observed, there was really no higher
power than Parliament.
But in America, a new idea about ultimate legal authority had evolved.
The Constitution was envisioned as no actual part of the government at all, but,
rather, it was to be a higher, distinct, and superior entity. Government in the United
States was viewed as merely a creation of the written Constitution. That Constitu-
1998]
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tion represented the supreme sovereignty of the American people themselves. The
Constitution was fundamental law, which was immune from even legislative en-
croachment. It was a huge departure from the experience of the several states. In
all but two states, the constitutions were written by the legislatures, and could, of
course, be altered or abolished by those same bodies. But, in this new approach, if
the national Constitution required change, the sovereign people would have to be
the ones to change it. Thus, the concepts of popular sovereignty and the higher law
tradition were blended and incorporated into a unique new kind of American con-
stitutionalism.
VI. AMERICAN FEDERALISM
The Founders also departed from practically all historical precedents by
producing the system known as American federalism, and they did this with great
care and skill, for the issue of the states' sovereignty was a flashpoint upon which
the endeavor at Philadelphia could very quickly have disintegrated.
The Constitution really consists of two types of provisions. One set of
provisions is concerned with structure - the separation of functions, the depart-
ments of administration, the House of Representatives, the Senate, the President,
the Judiciary, and their relations to one another.
The other set of provisions is concerned with the relation of the states to
the general government. The powers of the general government are limited, and
the powers of the states are also under certain restrictions. This federalism was
entirely new. There was nothing like it in the colonial charters or in the state con-
stitutions of 1776 and 1777.
The development of federalism went through similar stages and took al-
most as long in its processes as the development of the structural parts of the Con-
stitution. It had been an important and a much debated question for more than a
hundred years before 1776, and more than twenty plans of power sharing had been
suggested and discussed.
As the Articles of Confederation aptly demonstrated, the protection of the
states' prerogatives continued to be held very dear, even in the face of the exigen-
cies of newly claimed independence and armed conflict with Britain. What the
Framers successfully crafted in 1787 was a system which retained enough sover-
eignty for the states to keep them from rejecting the new Constitution, and, at the
same time, provided sufficient power to the national government so that it could be
effective at home, and establish a credible presence in international affairs - quite
an achievement!
Ingeniously, the Framers, with the Great Compromise, provided this sense
of the states' autonomy and continued sovereignty. But, especially helpful in this
regard was the concept of enumerated powers. The jurisdiction of the new, pro-
posed government, wrote Madison in The Federalist Number 39, extended "to
certain enumerated objects only, and left to the several states a residuary and in-
violable sovereignty over all other objects."
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What happened in Philadelphia was, then, truly extraordinary. The Fram-
ers called upon ancient and tried principles of governance, looked extensively to
the lessons of English history, laced that knowledge with political acumen and
practical colonial and state experience, and created a complex and mixed govern-
ment of dispersed powers - some separate, some overlapping - which they based
upon the philosophical principle of consent of the governed. Then they protected
that principle with a further internal system of delicate checks and balances, which
set up tensions that could only be relieved by cooperation and concurrence between
the branches. On top of all of that, they called upon their astute reading of the total
American experience to create a Constitution which was, in the words of John Mar-
shall, "intended to endure for ages to come."
Considered from this point of view, I believe that the stellar achievement
of the Framers is clearly undeniable. Washington, writing to Lafayette on February
7, 1788, referred to the product of the Framers as "little short of a miracle." And,
indeed, the beneficent hand of Providence seems to have brought about a conver-
gence of time and circumstances and men of genius, all of which were conducive to
the production of such a document. As Catherine Drinker Bowen has said:
[a]ctually, it was the one moment, the one stroke of the conti-
nental clock when such an experiment had a chance to suc-
ceed. Five years earlier and the states would not have been
ready. Since then the creation and operation of their own state
constitutions had taught them, prepared them. Five years later
and the French Revolution, with its violence and blood, would
have slowed the states into caution, dividing them (as it indeed
divided them) into opposing ideological camps.
But there was certainly no "miracle at Philadelphia," in the sense that it
simply fell like manna from heaven. Rather, the achievement there happened be-
cause extremely capable, knowledgeable men drew upon their formidable experi-
ence and their spirit of compromise, and their wisdom and familiarity with history,
to meet their objective of establishing a system that had the best possible prospects
of receiving approval of the states, and of maintaining freedom. They created a
system that could be adapted "to the various crises of human affairs."
But, just as the birth of the new nation depended on the quality of the men
who gave it life, so does its continued vitality depend upon the quality of the men
and women of succeeding generations and their determination to preserve the gov-
erning principles and powers set forth in the Constitution.
I will now take some of your questions for a brief time. Then, after a short
break, we will return, continue our historical journey, and take a look at just how
well we have fared under our now 200 year old charter. Is it guiding us safely
through the ages? We shall see.
When we ended our discussion last, we had said we would begin again by
looking at how well we have fared after 200 years of constitutional government.
What tools did the Framers give us to protect what they had so ingeniously crafted
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and how well have we used these tools of preservation? In the Federalist Number
48, Madison asked, "[w]ill it be sufficient to mark with precision the boundaries in
the Constitution of the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against
the encroaching spirit of power?" The Framers' knowledge of English history and
their deep understanding of human nature had taught them that the answer to Madi-
son's question was a resounding, No! The Framers' solution was to bolster the
"parchment" barriers in the system with what we commonly refer to as "checks
and balances."
Madison, writing in the Federalist Number 51, observed that, because such
"external checks" were ineffective, maintaining the separation of powers would
require "internal checks" that linked the officeholders' personal ambitions to their
duties. Officials would fiercely defend and uphold their various constitutional pre-
rogatives if they felt that doing so also furthered their own personal aspirations.
Thus, it is the concept of "ambition checking ambition" - not virtue - which
helps to maintain our constitutional structure and purpose.
But, what else did the Framers construct to protect our liberties? As we
shall see, the absolute bedrock of the people's continued freedom from tyranny and
excesses of all types of authority is, again, anchored in the pages of history. It is
the power of the purse.
Since time immemorial, Anglo-Saxon kings, and the early English kings,
had levied taxes on their subjects with the advice and consent of the Witenagemot
or King's Council - and, with the coming of the Normans, the Magnum Concilium,
or Great Council - which was the historical precursor of Parliament. By the way, I
often refer to my staff as my Witenagemot, and to a smaller inner-office group as
my Witan or my Curia Regis. They are wise and trusted advisors, and besides, it
makes them feel good!
During the development of Parliament in the 1300's, the king continued to
seek approval of revenues he wanted for the operation of government and for mili-
tary activities in Scotland, France, and elsewhere. In return for granting the king's
requests for money, however, Parliament began to extract concessions from the
king and secure the redress of grievances. If the king resisted, then Parliament
would simply refuse to grant his requests for money - the classic "quid pro quo"
so essential to good legislation and compromise.
In 1297 - 701 years ago - this effective practice was formalized when
Edward I reluctantly agreed to the "Confirmation of the Charters." In doing so, he
agreed that, in the future, he would not levy "aids, taxes, nor prises, but by the
common consent of the realm."
By 1395, all grants to the King were made "by the Commons with the ad-
vice and consent of the Lords." Approval of all monies began in the House of
Commons. The right of the Commons to originate taxes and money grants had
only become a right by tradition and custom, but it was a custom not easily shaken.
For example, Henry IV had failed in 1407 when he tried to proceed first through
the House of Lords. The Commons simply refused to accept such as being "a great
prejudice and derogation of their liberties." It is no coincidence that Article I, Sec-
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tion 7, of the U.S. Constitution reflects the very same principle: "[a]ll Bills for
raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives."
It was not long until Parliament began to express its views on just exactly
how, and for what, such money grants were to be spent. The specificity and detail
in some of these early appropriations are striking. For instance, a grant was made
to Edward IV in 1472 to cover the expenses of 13,000 archers for one year at a
daily wage of sixpence.
Slowly, we see the power of the purse gradually becoming honed, sharp-
ened, refined, and utilized as an effective tool, not only for resisting unreasonable
demands of the King, but also for effectively promoting specific policy objectives
which were important to Parliament.
The right of Parliament to check or audit accounts followed, as a natural
consequence, the practice of making annual appropriations for specified objectives.
Even as early as 1340, a Committee of Parliament was appointed to examine the
manner in which the last subsidy had been expended. Henry IV resisted a similar
audit in 1406, but in 1407 he conceded to Parliament the right to scrutinize the
ways in which appropriations were spent, and such audits became a settled usage.
These two principles - that of Parliament's appropriating monies, and that
of auditing or oversight - were combined by the Framers in a single paragraph of
our Constitution. Article I, Section 9, says "[n]o Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular
Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall
be published from time to time."
Remember that it was mainly the violation of the principle of taxation by
consent of those paying the tax that led to the revolt of the colonies in America.
The Declaration of Independence, explicitly names, as one of the reasons for sepa-
ration from England, "imposing taxes on us without our consent." Thus, we see
that the power to appropriate monies and "to lay and collect Taxes" are vested by
Article I, solely in the legislative branch, the people's duly elected representatives.
James Madison summed up in a very few words the significance of the
power of the purse in the protection of the people's rights and liberties. Referring
to the House of Representatives in Federalist Number 58, he said: "[t]his power
over the purse, may in fact be regarded as the most compleat and effectual weapon
with which any Constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people
for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just
and salutary measure."
This essential tool - control of the purse by the people's representatives in
Congress - lies at the very foundation of our freedoms. It is the fulcrum of the
people's leverage. As enshrined in the Constitution, it is one of the chief protectors
of all our cherished freedoms. This control of the purse is one of the most effective
bulwarks ever constructed to repel a despot, control a tyrant, or shackle the hands
of an overreaching executive. Chip away at this fundamental barrier and one chips
away at the very cornerstone of the people's liberties.
But, incredibly, we, in our day, seem to be intent on doing just exactly that
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- steadily chipping away at the power of the purse, and at the other constitutional
powers and prerogatives of the people's representatives in Congress as well.
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO BALANCE BUDGET
An effort to mandate a balanced budget each year through an amendment
to the Constitution is one such threat to the control of the purse and to the delicate
balance so carefully crafted by the Framers. Such an idea has become almost uni-
versally popular in our country. But, popular is not always the equivalent of wise,
as we shall see.
A balanced budget constitutional amendment was first introduced in 1936,
and various versions have been proposed by Congress and introduced regularly
since the 1970's. Yet, the only proposed balanced budget amendment ever to have
passed the Senate was S.J. Res. 58, adopted by the Senate in 1982. I voted for it.
That is right. I voted for it. I had not yet read and researched the venerable history
of the power of the purse to the degree that I now have. Since that time in 1982, I
have focused carefully on the proposal. I now fully understand its dangers. I have
never since supported any version of such an amendment, and I, more than any
other Senator, have repeatedly led the successful charge against it.
I believe that if such an amendment were ever adopted and enforced, there
would be major ramifications for the separation of powers, possibly serving to jus-
tify presidential impoundments of funds to meet the amendment's requirements or
even involving the judiciary in overseeing portions of the budget process.
The advocates of riveting a requirement for a yearly balanced federal
budget into the text of the Constitution, for the most part, are advocates of a par-
ticular economic theory which teaches that deficits, especially sizable ones, are
economically, politically, and morally ruinous, and not necessarily in that order.
But, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once observed, "a Constitution is not in-
tended to embody a particular economic theory.. . ." Such an amendment would
subjugate all goals to an inflexible standard. It would tend to ignore such economic
cycles as recessions. It would turn a blind eye to the needs of our people during
such natural disasters as floods, hurricanes, droughts, and earthquakes.
Moreover, such an amendment would tend to advance the further erosion
of Congress's already marked deterioration as a true deliberative body. Instead of
enlightening public debate about the needs of our people and the ordering of our
national priorities, under the restrictions of such an amendment, every choice,
henceforth, would be shackled to the all-pervasive, overpowering constitutional
requirement for budget balance.
In the last quarter of this century, federal budgeting has monopolized cen-
ter stage in American politics. Yet, the taxing and spending powers of the Con-
gress, ironically, have become the focal point of efforts to construct procedural
devices that would limit their unfettered operation, instead of efforts to promote a
general recognition and understanding that these taxing and spending powers are
absolutely central to our liberty.
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Indeed, the primary purpose of the legislative branch is to be found in its
unique capacity to publicly, in the light of day, and under the hot lights of full me-
dia scrutiny, sort through competing interests, deliberate, reconcile, apportion pub-
lic treasure, and forge laws, compromises, solutions, and priorities which are com-
patible with our national objectives and with the public good.
But, sadly Congress no longer functions primarily as a truly deliberative
body, and the historic, time-tested, and wise constitutional order we all profess to
so revere is beginning to realign itself accordingly. I believe that our constitutional
structure is increasingly in peril, and that it is the people's branch which is in most
danger of giving way. Congress is excessively concerned with political party mat-
ters, petty partisanship, and wants increasingly to just delegate portions of its leg-
islative authority, including its power of the purse, to other entities.
Let me give you a particularly galling illustration of exactly what I mean.
On March 23, 1995, the Senate passed by a vote of sixty-nine to twenty-nine, the
Line Item Veto Act - a self-mutilation of its own power over the purse, driven by
popular misconception, a lack of understanding about the importance and the his-
tory of control of the purse strings, and an amazing disregard for the Constitution.
This was an act of sheer, irresponsible, raw, demagoguery!
In a too-clever attempt to end-run the Bicameralism and Presentment
Clauses of the Constitution, the Line-Item Veto Act allows the President to sign an
appropriations bill into law and then, quite preposterously, within five days, strike
out parts of that same law which he does not like.
It, in effect, gives the President power to unilaterally amend legislation af-
ter it has become law. It makes him a superlegislator. He can now completely
circumvent the will of both houses of Congress, and alter the careful compromises,
which are such an essential part of lawmaking. Congress's only recourse to the
violence the executive can now do to its careful deliberations is to begin a disap-
proval resolution, which requires a rollcall vote in each House, and which the
President can also veto.
So much for hundreds of years of history, experience, and human blood-
shed! So much for the long centuries of British experience in controlling a tyranni-
cal monarch. We took the easy way out in Congress. We handed the Executive
Branch a power that Presidents had been salivating after for years - the line item
veto!
And why does the Executive covet this device so much? Not so much be-
cause it gives the executive control over federal spending, because, of course, it
does not. The line item veto only allows such canceling of money items in about
one-third of the total budget. Mandatory programs and entitlement programs -
where the expenditure growth really is - cannot be touched by the "line out"
authority in this nefarious law.
No, it is not for the purpose of control of the deficit that Presidents have
wanted a line item veto. It is greed for more power - power to intimidate members
of Congress. This device allows the President to threaten to cancel items which
benefit various congressional districts or states in exchange for a vote on a treaty, a
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vote on a nomination, or even support for the President's own funding priorities.
With this insidious tool, the peoples' elected representatives can be squeezed like
putty in the hands of a President. Can you imagine Lyndon Baines Johnson with
such a weapon? Talking with Johnson always left one feeling like one arm could
never be used again. With a line item veto, he would have been formidable, in-
deed!
On two occasions I have joined with several of my colleagues in the Con-
gress in an effort to have the Line Item Veto Act declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court. Both times, a U.S. District Court has declared the law unconstitu-
tional, and might I add that both U.S. District Court judges who wrote those opin-
ions were appointed by Ronald Reagan, the loudest proponent of the line-item veto,
although all Presidents in this century except Taft have wanted the power.
In June of 1997, in the case of Raines v. Byrd, the Court ruled that, as
Members of Congress, we had not suffered personal injury, and, therefore, lacked
judicial standing. I have higher hopes for our second journey to the High Court,
where we will appear as friends of the Court. This time, the legal challenge is be-
ing brought by parties who stand to suffer great economic damage as a conse-
quence of the President's actions under the Line Item Veto Act.
Each and every one of you ought to be seriously concerned about what
Congress has done. Along with myself, every single citizen of this nation ought to
be fervently hoping that the Supreme Court strikes this law down. Again and
again, throughout history, we have seen the control of the purse as exercised by
Congress as the ultimate arrow in the people's quiver when it comes to reigning in
an overly zealous executive. We cannot take our liberties for granted. Be assured
that the executive branch never sleeps. It is always hungry - hungry for more
power.
There are powerful forces which constantly work toward expansion of the
power of the Executive Branch and the President - the bully pulpit; the sheer size
of the bureaucracy which serves that President, and its ability to operate on a day-
to-day basis without really much scrutiny by the public; his vast patronage powers
as titular head of his party; and the often heard presidential claim of being the sole
figure in the government who represents all of the people - all of these work to
enhance the actual power of the executive. But among the most compelling of all
of the devices which contribute to a precipitous enhancement of presidential
authority is the appellation "Commander in Chief' and the term "national secu-
rity."
The term "national security" is one which can be used to cover many ac-
tivities, missions, or goals - secret or otherwise. Like love, it can be made to cover
a multitude of sins. I believe that the United States is in a period of increasing peril
for its constitutional institutions, and that such buzzwords as "Commander in
Chief' and "national security" will be increasingly invoked by Presidents as vari-
ous international situations arise. Involvement of the nation in military ventures
always results in the expansion of presidential powers, especially in the area of
justifying presidential use of military force without congressional authorization.
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For example, in recent years Presidents have increasingly claimed that executive
war power authority is sanctioned by the U.S.' membership in such world organi-
zations as the U.N.
Consider our near debacle in Somalia. This began as an effort by our na-
tion and others to provide food and humanitarian aid to war-torn Somalia. But,
after the deaths of some American soldiers involved in that effort, the mission then
changed, and became an unwise attempt by U.N. forces to settle disputes between
African warlords. What an impossible task! Don Quixote had a better grip on re-
ality when he went out to tilt at windmills! Incredibly, this unwise venture was
only finally stopped when I led an effort in Congress to shut off the money for the
operation.
Here is a bit of background on that event. The U.N. Security Council
passed a Resolution on December 3, 1992, authorizing member states to use mili-
tary force to ensure the distribution of humanitarian aid and protect relief agencies.
A statement to the Nation by President Bush on December 4, said: "[o]ur mission
has a limited objective - to open supply routes, to get the food moving, and to
prepare the way for a U.N. peacekeeping force to keep it moving." President-elect
Clinton responded on the same day; "I support President Bush's decision to dedi-
cate U.S. forces in support of the United Nations' clearly-defined humanitarian
mission."
The first U.S. forces arrived on December 8. The U.S. Senate endorsed the
limited humanitarian mission in Senate Joint Resolution 345 in February 1993, in
which we authorized the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possi-
ble a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."
Note carefully what that resolution endorsed. It endorsed a limited grant
of auth6rity for a strictly humanitarian purpose. It was not a grant of authority for
nation-building or forced political reconciliation, or for military action by U.S.
forces. The effort was called Operation Restore Hope. The humanitarian mission
was successful, and massive starvation was ended in Somalia. Nevertheless, three
months later, in May 1993, the mission changed, without endorsement or debate in
the Congress. U.N. peacekeeping forces began operating under Chapter Seven of
the U.N. Charter; that is, in a situation where the conflicting parties in Somalia had
not signed on.
In effect, peace was being forced on unwilling parties, and the Senate had
never approved the transformed mission, which, later in May, evolved further into a
shaky experiment in political and economic nation-building using American forces.
This nation-building miracle was to be pulled off in Somalia, a country whose po-
litical and economic institutions had completely failed. I wrote a New York Times
op-ed entitled, "Perils of Peacekeeping," in which I called for the removal of U.S.
forces because the original humanitarian mission "has now been totally eclipsed by
a gang war in which the U.S. is taking sides under the U.N. umbrella." I thought
that summed up the situation quite nicely.
In September, during debate on the Fiscal Year Defense Authorization bill,
I announced that I would offer an amendment to cut off funds for the operations by
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a date certain. Amazingly, my threatened use of the power of the purse to thwart
this unauthorized use of the U.S. military led both of the then party leaders of the
Senate, George Mitchell and Bob Dole, to work with the White House to circle the
wagons, and prevent a vote on my amendment! Members from across the political
spectrum voiced concern over my desire to put some limits on the President's so-
called war making authority. Sometimes, I wonder if anybody in Washington has
read the Constitution! Meanwhile, the White House indicated that it was reevalu-
ating the mission and would begin a withdrawal. Instead of a funding cutoff, a
compromise was reached to produce a report on withdrawing U.S. forces.
I concluded that we were on a fast train to disaster. I was right. On Octo-
ber 3, eighteen American soldiers were slaughtered in a fifteen-hour battle. This
led to the horrific television spectacle that many of you may vividly remember, of
the subsequent dragging of a U.S. soldier's body by truck around Mogadishu, the
capital of Somalia. I was sickened. All I could think of was the poor family of that
soldier. I was determined to offer an amendment to cut off funding after a certain
date, and I said so. The White House, again, lined up both Mitchell and Dole to
block a vote. After considerable negotiation, a compromise was finally reached in
which the Senate did pass my amendment to cut off funding at the end of March
1994. It was a later time frame than I wanted, but it was a completely effective
exercise of the power of the purse. Incidentally, it was the first conclusive use of
that power of the purse since the 1974 end of U.S. participation in the conflict in
Vietnam. But, I had to contend with the opposition of the White House and both
the Republican and Democratic leaders of the Senate in order to assert the Senate's
constitutional prerogatives.
Since that time, the threat of the power of the purse has been used more
frequently as a preferred mechanism to keep the current administration's military
operations overseas in check. Bosnian operations have been funded on an annual
basis with so-called "drop-dead" dates (the latest one being May 1, 1998) unless
further authorized by Congress. President Clinton has recently announced that he
wants Congress to authorize an indefinite extension of a U.S. military presence in
Bosnia. I am considering offering an amendment which would call upon the Ad-
ministration to leverage greater involvement of other NATO members with ground
forces before we spend more U.S. treasure in that troubled part of the world.
To me, the lesson here is clear. The power of the purse, i.e., the need for
funds in such cases, has become the only way to force a debate and to force a vote
in Congress about the wisdom of such risky foreign adventures, and, therefore, the
only way to expose the obvious dangers in such efforts to the American people.
Just as Congress' control over the purse can be the ultimate tool in reign-
ing in the power of a runaway executive, just so can the line item veto become the
ultimate tool for the convenient expansion of a President's powers. Suppose the
Administration had been able to threaten members with the line item veto authority
in exchange for support for one of these risky foreign enterprises? Our history
might be vastly different from what it is today.
Truman in Korea, Bush in the Persian Gulf, Clinton in Haiti and in Bosnia
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and in the Persian Gulf - all of these represent instances of a President's claiming
authority for military action, and thereby quite effectively circumventing the con-
stitutional authority of the Congress as the sole entity which can declare war and
commit American lives and treasure to such efforts. But, some may say, we are
part of the international community. We must support others so they will support
us. These observations may be true, but they are beside the point.
The constitutional framework arranged by the Framers speaks with crystal
clarity regarding the war powers. The authority to initiate war rests solely with
Congress, except for one narrow area - the inherent defensive authority to repel
sudden attacks on our country, which is granted to the Commander in Chief. Let us
listen for a moment to the words of President Abraham Lincoln in a letter to Wil-
liam H. Hemdon on the subject of the exercise of the unfettered use of the war
power by a President:
[a]llow the President to invade a neighboring nation, when-
ever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and
you allow him to do so, whenever he may choose to say he
deems it necessary for such purpose -- and you allow him to
make war at pleasure. Study to see if you can fix any limit
to his power in this respect, after you have given him so
much as you propose. If, today, he should choose to say he
thinks it necessary to invade Canada, to prevent the British
from invading us, how could you stop him? You may say to
him, 'I see no probability of the British invading us' but he
will say to you 'be silent; I see it, if you don't....'
Well, obviously, Lincoln had it absolutely right with regard to the consti-
tutional wisdom of the Framers. And the legislative histories of both the U.N. Par-
ticipation Act and the NATO Treaty firmly establish that the President has no type
of unilateral war power authority granted to him by virtue of our country's partici-
pation in these two international organizations. It is entirely preposterous to claim
that an international treaty, which must be consented to by the United States Sen-
ate, somehow strips the Senate and the House of their constitutional mandate to
declare war! Oh, and by the way, calling a conflict a "police action" does not give
the President magical authority to use military force without the authorization of
Congress, any more than calling a dog a cat suddenly empowers a dog to climb
trees.
VIII. AMBITION V. AMBITION
But, Senator, why don't members of Congress rise up and assert their con-
stitutional prerogatives? What about the Federalist Papers? Why doesn't ambition
check ambition as the Framers intended?
We may be seeing a modem perversion of what the framers thought of as
"ambition." Ambition in politics today, I fear, has become simply the more mun-
dane "ambition" to be reelected. And with such a limited horizon - reelection as
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the sine qua non of public life - an instinct for ducking and dodging tends to pre-
vail. Why take on the hard questions when there is an attractive option like the
massive delegation of powers to other authorities?
Yes, let's give more and more power to the President, who is, of course,
not even directly elected by the people. The trend becomes even more perverse
when one considers that, generally, less than half of the eligible voters in the
United States elect the electors who, in turn, elect the President. Gone are the les-
sons of history.
But, some of you may be wondering why I am so concerned. After all, the
Bill of Rights is always there to protect the people's liberties. Well, let's take a
look at the historical background on the Bill of Rights.
On September 12, 1787, the only major task left for the delegates at the
constitutional convention was to adopt, engross, and sign the finished Constitution
reported by the Committee on Style. The delegates were tired. It was hot. They
wanted to go home. At some point, George Mason remarked to Elbridge Gerry that
he, "wished the plan had been prefaced by a Bill of Rights," to help quiet any lin-
gering public worries about the new Constitution. No stirring speech about civil
liberties occurred. No motion was made for the adoption of a Bill of Rights. El-
bridge Gerry moved for a Committee to prepare a bill; Mason seconded the motion.
Without any debate the delegates then promptly defeated the motion ten to zip! A
motion to endorse freedom of the press was also defeated after Roger Sherman
declared, "[i]t is unnecessary. The power of Congress does not extend to the
press."
This is an extremely revealing comment. It clearly demonstrates the com-
plete faith which the Framers had in the actual structure - the formalized separa-
tions of powers, and the checks and balances - of the government they had set up
to protect the people's liberties. Not a delegate to the convention opposed a Bill of
Rights in principle. It was simply that an overwhelming majority believed that it
was just unnecessary. In fact, some worried that if a separate list of rights were
framed which omitted some rights, those omitted rights might be the first infringed.
The framers were realists, and they understood well that such a paper protection of
rights meant very little, especially in times of popular hysteria or war. And all of
them could cite examples of gross violations of such rights in the states which had
bills of rights in their constitutions.
In truth, our own much touted, much heralded Bill of Rights - which be-
came part of the Constitution on December 15, 1791 - was an afterthought which
came to be adopted because of political expediency. The lack of a Bill of Rights
was being used as their strongest argument by the anti-federalists - those who op-
posed ratification. Patrick Henry even went about claiming that the proposed Con-
stitution empowered the United States to torture citizens to confess their violations
of congressionally enacted law! In state after state, where ratification was in some
doubt, Federalists pledged themselves to various amendments to protect civil liber-
ties. In historical fact, our Bill of Rights was, in the main, the result of political
necessity for the Federalists' cause to ensure ratification of their brilliantly-crafted
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Constitution. Likewise, a Bill of Rights was embraced by many anti-federalists,
mostly as a tactic to help defeat the proposed Constitution.
If we go back to our poll numbers of this morning, we will recall that only
sixty-six percent of those questioned even recognized that the first ten amendments
to the Constitution are the Bill of Rights. I wonder how many would know or even
believe that the Bill of Rights was actually viewed by the Framers as unnecessary,
and that it was finally adopted as a sort of gimmick to help ensure ratification? I
would wager not many.
So, where have we finally touched down after our long flight from the
brilliance of the founders' vision in 1787 to the complexities of the 1990's? I sus-
pect that the winds of expediency, of demagoguery, of apathy, and, yes, of igno-
rance may have blown us quite far from that carefully chartered constitutional
course. In a world fascinated by speed and efficiency and consumed by the exigen-
cies of coping with the race and pace of events, it is all too easy to become uninter-
ested in, or impatient with, the arcane workings of our constitutional system. But a
way must be found to restore genuine interest in the Constitution and in the ration-
ale behind the structure of government which it supports. It is easy to take our
freedoms for granted. It is easy to forget, indeed, especially if one never even
knew, about the hundreds of years of human history, the bloodshed, the sacrifice,
and the experience that went into the final production of the Constitution that we
regard so highly, yet, obviously no longer really comprehend. The reverence for
the Constitution that was reflected in the poll I cited when we began this morning is
heartening, but it is not enough to protect our Republic through the next 100 years.
While few would suggest amending the Bill of Rights, other constitutional
amendments which would do major damage to the power balance in the Constitu-
tion are routine, and often are championed by the voting public like mother's milk.
I say this not to denigrate in any way our Bill of Rights, but only to point out the
disparity between the way it is regarded by the public, and the way the other vital
constitutional protections of our liberty are viewed.
The Bill of Rights - which was tacked onto our basic charter as a post-
script to help ensure its ratification by the states - is viewed by many as the prime
protector of our freedoms, while the first seven articles are often seen only as prime
targets for change. Such views are wrongheaded and dangerous. They reveal a
total ignorance of the need to diligently assert the prerogatives of the people's
branch.
As a nation, we are all guilty of abominably lax vigilance over our respon-
sibilities - members of Congress who cower at the slightest criticism, and who do
not even bother to study and understand the document they take a solemn oath to
support and defend; Presidents eager to grab power to make their mark on history
larger; representatives of the media, who report significant events without really
understanding them because they don't understand history; talk-show demagogues
who rail over the airways, while they generate ill-informed and destructive anger;
and ordinary citizens, who do not even bother to vote. Let us remember the words
of John Philpot Curran, the Irish orator and statesman, who commented that, "[t]he
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condition upon which God hath given liberty to man is eternal vigilance; which
condition if he breaks, servitude is at once the consequence of his crime and the
punishment of his guilt."
Those of us who teach, those of us educated in the discipline of law, and
those of us who purport to serve the public in some capacity, have a special respon-
sibility to make others sensitive to the importance of every citizen's role in pre-
serving our freedoms. But, we can all do more, and we must!
IX. CONCLUSION
We started this day with a most disturbing poll. Let us close with the re-
sults of a study which may shed some useful light upon at least one possible reason
why such ignorance about our Constitution exists. I refer to the Thomas B. Ford-
ham Foundation's first-ever appraisal of state standards for history in thirty-eight
states, published in February of 1998. This is a brand new study, which points out
something that I have believed for quite a while. Let me quote from the foreword
of the study on its general findings about how thirty-eight states are doing in the
effort to teach history to our grade school and high school students:
the vast majority of young Americans are attending school in
states that do not consider the study of history to be especially
important. No doubt some children are learning lots of solid
history from excellent teachers in fine schools. Their good
fortune, however, appears to be serendipitous. State standards
rarely constitute a ceiling on what can be taught and learned.
But it's not unreasonable to view them as the floor below
which no child or school should fall .... [W]hen it comes to
history, most states have placed that floor where the sub-
basement ought to be .... [I]n only a few instances is history
itself the focus of the state academic standards that pertain to
it. In most jurisdictions, history remains mired in a curricular
swamp called 'social studies,' ....
We can correct this deplorable treatment of history in our schools and we
must. For only with a thorough knowledge of history can we ever expect our peo-
ple to appreciate the gift of the Framers or the experience and the struggles going
back centuries which combined to make us free. Only with a citizenry that under-
stands its responsibilities in a republic such as ours can we ever expect to elect
office holders with the intelligence to represent the people well, the honesty to deal
with them truthfully, and the determination to effectively promote the people's
interests and preserve their liberties, no matter what the personal political conse-
quences. We can build upon the respect and reverence we still hold for our Con-
stitution. But we had better start now before, through ignorance and apathy, even
that much slips away from us.
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